In Part 1 of this series, we touched on some ways to make it so difficult to pull off a hack-attack, that the perpetrator will most likely want to go somewhere else and try their attack.

In this section, we’re going to address testing, maintaining and other important items that deserve your attention.

Testing

Once you have fixed all of the issues, you need to test everything to make sure it works the way it is supposed to. You must first create benchmarks in which you are testing against. Just to run a test for the sake of running a test is futile. Once the benchmark(s) have been set, you are ready to test:

• Run port scans to ensure only required ports and services are open and/or running
• Firewalls detect intrusions
• Switches and routers have only active administrator accounts
• Passwords adhere to compliance requirements etc

Be sure to document your test procedure(s) step-by-step as well as the test results. Note if the outcome of the test was expected or not. If there is anything that fails during your testing, you need to fix those issues and retest. Don’t skimp on testing…hackers are not forgiving and just like in dodge ball, there are no “do-overs”.

Maintaining

Once you have tested everything and are assured that your organization is where they need to be, you now need to create and maintain a testing program. Don’t try creating a maintenance program prior to everything being tested, as you will surely be making changes to the maintenance program, making are previous efforts null. Your maintenance program needs to have firm dates / times set for scheduled maintenance. You need to have multiple maintenance programs set up such as:

• Patch management
• Password management
• Network account management
• System management
• Applications management
• Operating system management
• Security administration etc

By setting up multiple maintenance programs you are able to create “silo’s” for each area and assign personnel who are responsible for each of these areas. This allows for a better view should there be a failure in any of these areas…and makes it easier to see where the failure occurred and to fix the area faster.

Worth Considering

There are a few tricks that you can implement on your network that will make a hacker think twice about trying anything. The more difficult you make it for the hacker to attack, the more likely it is that they will go somewhere else to attack. As someone who has spent the better part of the past quarter of a century protecting companies against attackers, I have listed a few neat tricks you can implement:

Honey Pots

A honey pot is a trap set to detect, deflect, or in some manner counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. Generally it consists of a computer, data, or a network site that appears to be part of a network, but is actually isolated, (un)protected, and monitored, and which seems to contain information or a resource of value to attackers. These honey pots can be used to track and in some cases trap and report a hacker.

Trace Routing

Having the attacker’s IP is all well and good, but what can you do with it? The answer is, a lot more! It’s not enough to have the address, you also need to know where the attacker’s connections are coming from. You may have used automated trace routing tools before, but do you know how they work?

Go back to MSDOS and type tracert *type IP address/hostname here*

Now, what happens is, the Trace route will show you all the computers in between you and the target machine, including blockages, firewalls etc. More often than not, the hostname address listed before the final one will belong to the hacker’s ISP company. It’ll either say who the ISP is somewhere in there, or else you run a second trace on the new IP/hostname address to see who the ISP Company in question is.

Reverse DNS Query

This is probably the most effective way of running a trace on somebody. If ever you’re in a chat room and you see someone saying that they’ve “hacked into a satellite orbiting the Earth, and are taking pictures of your house right now”, ignore them because that’s just bad movie nonsense. THIS method is the way to go, with regard to finding out what country (even maybe what state/city etc.) someone resides, although it’s actually almost impossible to find an EXACT geographical location without actually breaking into your ISP’s head office and running off with the safe.

To run an rDNS query, simply go back to MS-DOS and type netstat and hit return. Any active connections will resolve to hostnames rather than a numerical format.

DNS stands for Domain Name Server. These are machines connected to the Internet whose job it is to keep track of the IP Addresses and Domain Names of other machines. When called upon, they take the ASCII Domain Name and convert it to the relevant numeric IP Address. A DNS search translates a hostname into an IP address….which is why we can enter “www.hotmail.com” and get the website to come up, instead of having to actually remember Hotmail’s IP address and enter that instead.

Well, reverse DNS, of course, translates the IP address into a hostname (i.e., in letters and words instead of numbers, because sometimes the hacker will employ various methods to stop netstat from picking up a correct hostname).

While we’ve given you a very high level look at what needs to be done to better protect yourself from a hack attack, we believe it represents the best place to start in understanding what you need to do.

James Holler is founder of Abidance Consulting.

Part 1 of a 2-part series

First, let me start with the bad news: There is no absolute way to prevent an internal or external hack-attack. With that said, there are some things that you can do that will make it so difficult to pull off a hack-attack, that the perpetrator will most likely want to go somewhere else and try their attack.

Now, there is an old saying, “cleanliness is next to Godliness.” I am sure you have all heard that line at some time in your life. This saying holds true in the security world. If your network is in total shambles (DAT files not updated, Service Packs are so far behind your need an abacus to determine how many versions behind you are, etc.) and your Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is monitored by humans only during business hours, then you have a “dirty” network that needs to either be cleaned, or as my mom used to tell me…let’s just burn your room and start over, it will be easier that way. If your network/server room looks as if a spaghetti factory has blown up, get it cleaned up by rewiring it using tags on each line so you know where each of the cables is assigned.

The first thing you need to understand in preparing to get your network in top form is to not only determine what is wrong with it, but to also be open to criticism from experts. Put away the ego (one of the top reasons why networks are in shambles to begin with) so that you can listen and learn from your internal experts or external consultants – you hired them, now listen to them.

In Part 1, we’ll look at network discovery issues, vulnerability assessments, and discuss ways to fix some of these challenges.

Network Discovery

Before you can determine what’s wrong with your network, you must first know what your network looks like. You will want to conduct a thorough network discovery since you are going to need to know not only what devices are on your network, but also where they are. Please don’t think that you are going to run a piece of software that will show you everything. If you have a wireless or dial-up modem hanging off of your network and the power button is off, you may never discover it. You may need to do a physical inspection of your entire facility…look up in the ceiling…those pesky tiles can support the weight of a modem and even an old sandwich from 4 years ago. I personally use an iPaq handheld device that is capable of “sniffing” out these modems, even when they are turned off. Now that you have a true and correct picture of your network, you will need to conduct a vulnerability assessment to determine what areas are weak and are in need of attention.

Vulnerability Assessment

To ensure that there are no “cover-ups” by your staff, it is recommended that you have an outside consulting firm come in and conduct the assessment for you. Depending on the size of your organization, the fee’s for this could be $15k to $30k or more. The final report to be delivered should be comprehensive in nature. Be sure to ask for sample reports prior to awarding a contract or project to anyone. There are areas that must be looked at closely. Make sure whoever you assign the project to gives you a list of the services they are going to run. My only word of caution here is that you do not allow a penetration attack be made against your Primary Domain Controller (PDC). Once the assessment is completed, make sure that you not only address the issues, but fix the issues.

Fixing The Issues

When you do get the final report, there are going to be a lot of errors that need to be fixed. Don’t worry; the “bark” of the report is much worse than the “bite”. Depending on how bad your network was when the assessment was conducted, you may have a few pages of issues to as much as a thousand pages of issues – one assessment we did a few years back yielded almost 7,000 pages (a government agency…need I say more). When you are reading your final report, one of the first questions you need to ask yourself is, “Where do I begin”? Not to worry, your security staff/consultants should prioritize what needs to be done and at what point in the project does it need to be done. The point at which a certain task is completed is very important since everything has a logical order of semblance to it…you wouldn’t put the seats in a car before you laid down the carpet. Your staff and/or consultants should know this and be able to build out a project plan with a scope of work, keeping you (the stakeholder) in the loop at all times. Never be afraid to ask questions or challenge something if you feel it isn’t the right thing to do or you don’t understand why something is or isn’t being done.

To save time and money, you have to look at all of the different compliance issues you have to deal with (NERC, EPA, OSHA etc) and cross-walk your efforts to all of these compliance requirements. Doing this will ultimately save yourself time and money by not overlapping efforts.

Next time, we’ll look at testing, maintaining, and some other important issues that merit your attention.

James Holler is founder of Abidance Consulting.

According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), computer hackers have designed a virus that targets the industrial control systems, to include power plants, built by German engineering giant Siemens AG. The virus apparently activates a kind of malicious software that analysts say represents a growing corporate-espionage threat. This type of threat has been talked about for years — and it is now a reality.

The virus, Stuxnet, is spread by USB devices plugged into the physically unsecured USB ports on the machine(s) hosting the SCADA systems used by power plants and other types of facilities. The virus is programmed to steal data from computer systems that are used to monitor power plants built for anything from manufacturing to power generation to water treatment.

Researchers analyzing the virus say that they are now seeing several thousand infection attempts daily, though the virus is only activated if it lands on a computer running the Siemens systems software. Analysts warn that the attack on the Siemens’s systems marks an escalation in hackers’ efforts to use viruses for industrial espionage or sabotage purposes. This attack will surely make the NERC CIP regulations become even tighter more quickly than before this story broke.

Smaller, more isolated virus attacks have been attempted before on SCADA systems, but this is the first such infection where a virus is searching specifically for SCADA systems to attack on such a large-scale basis. The worry among security analysts should be that such viruses will, at some point, be used by criminal organizations or even terror groups to sabotage power plants.

The Stuxnet virus specifically exploits an unpatched vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows operating system, allowing it to spread through all USB devices. Once the virus has infected the Siemens system, it uses default passwords that are hard-coded into the Siemens software to upload false control-system data to a remote server. In an advisory that Siemens posted on its website, the company said Microsoft was working on a patch to fix the vulnerability at the USB interface. In its own website advisory, Microsoft has provided a workaround fix to offer some additional protection until a patch, or update, is ready.

Siemens said it expects to approve the updated virus scanners this week and also plans to provide customers with a diagnostic tool to check if their systems have been infected. In the meantime, the company’s website advisory urges customers not to use any USB storage sticks.

Siemens, Microsoft and other security analysts haven’t determined where the virus originated. Many of the infection attempts have originated from India, Indonesia and Iran. The virus likely was created in Asia, given the pattern of attacks and technology used.

James Holler is founder of Abidance Consulting.

H.R. 5026 Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act or the ‘‘GRID Act” as is it known, is setting the table to allow the current Administration to nationalize the grid. There, I said it!

This piece of legislation passed the House Energy & Commerce Committee unanimously 47-0. Apparently no sane person on the committee read this document as it allows the President to declare an “emergency” – (Page 6, Lines 10-18) Whenever the President issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat, the Commission may, with or without notice, hearing, or report, issue such orders for emergency measures as are necessary in its judgment to protect the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure against such threat. That applies to the entire grid, an RRO or even a single facility – (Page 7, Lines 9 – 15) An order for emergency measures under this subsection may apply to —

(A)  the Electric Reliability Organization;

(B)  a regional entity; or

(C) any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric infrastructure within the United States.

The GRID Act requires a facility to protect against Electromagnetic Weapons (non-nuclear), Geomagnetic Storms, a direct attack on a facility or its systems using an electromagnetic weapon and/or a geomagnetic storm causing adverse effects on the reliability of the Bulk Electric System.

Um, if you plan on monitoring the sun for storm activity and have a “Magic 8-Ball”, you might be able to figure out how to detect and protect against these issues. If you don’t happen to possess these monitoring abilities, then just plan on getting fined or having an “emergency” declared against you.

Oh, and just in case you weren’t aware, if an emergency is declared against your facility, FERC will step in and take control of your facility(ies) until the President has determined that the emergency is over. This is the same President who recently said at Hampton University that he did not know how to use an iPod, iPad, Xbox or a PlayStation. This is the very same President who wants the ability to declare an emergency on the grid!

There is one shining light in all of this. That light is your ability as a registered entity to recover your expenses in getting compliant either through rate increases or, if that’s not possible, Congress will put in place a “mechanism” (new taxes) so that you can recover your costs. The other light…I think this light is from an oncoming locomotive…is one that allows Congress to force you to turn over all of your documentation, regardless of its sensitivity, for their full review. Mmmmm makes me feel all warm and fuzzy to think that Congress will now be able to review and, at their whim, make all of our power producers documents a matter of public record. Check Please!

Read the entire ruling here.

In the IT world, there is ever that security pendulum that either seems to move toward ease of use or toward restrictive control.  Users typically tend towards the “ease of use” end of the spectrum because who wants to remember yet another password?  And who wants to install complicated VPN software or jump through extra authentication hoops? Conversely, IT folks (like me) tend to believe in restrictive control, in complicated passwords as possible, extra authentication hoops and logging everything that happens over an established connection.

With the advent of SaaS (Software as a Service), security becomes all the more critical in terms of both the user of the service and the administrator of the environment providing that service.  The beautiful thing about SaaS offerings like CATSWeb is that they are completely web based through HTML.  This makes life much easier for all parties.  From the user side, CATSWeb requires no special VPN software, nothing downloaded to the client computer and no local certificate store to verify a user’s identity  only  a web address and a password.  From the IT standpoint, all machines involved in providing CATSWeb SaaS are completely locked down to two ports of traffic; an IT dream come true.  Users will either be coming into a hosted CATSWeb environment via HTTP (port 80) or HTTPS (port 443). For securing a server to the world, only having to deal with two ports is about as simple a scenario as exists in the IT industry.

Because CATSWeb traffic is only on two ports, our servers are locked down completely, with those two ports being monitored constantly through the firewall, protected by live scanning anti-virus solutions and safeguarded by managed IDS (Intrusion Detection) systems.  Add to that all web traffic is logged from start to finish and you’ve got as bulletproof a server system as can be found.  And then we get to CATSWeb itself.

Within CATSWeb, AssurX has included additional security tools to ensure that your data is safe.  First, each customer company has their own unique, individual database not shared by anyone else. If a customer chooses to require SSL for accessing their CATSWeb database, this ensures that all traffic to and from that database is encrypted.  System access is automatically logged for easy review, including the IP address from where the traffic originated.

The rest we leave up to users.   I guess that’s where CATSWeb SaaS becomes a two-pendulum system. The “server security pendulum” we’ve chosen to swing as far toward restrictive control as possible.  The “user access pendulum” we leave to the users of CATSWeb.  An administrator in a CATSWeb system can set their own requirements for passwords for their users, establish their own session parameters such as session length and inactivity timeouts and much, much more.  This will allow any given SaaS CATSWeb system to have security anywhere along the user access pendulum, from easy to restrictive, based on what your requirements are.